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Comments
PowEn OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES TO COMPEL TESTIMONY AND PRODUCTION
OF RECORDS
This subject deals with two basically conflicting concepts of democratic
government which in this particular branch of the law clash sharply. On the
one hand we have the time honored Anglo-American doctrines of individual free-
dom and constitutionally guaranteed rights, privileges, and immunities; while
in direct opposition thereto is the increasing need for reliable information up-
on which to base sound legislation and public opinion. With the increasing
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accurate information concerning industry and its relation to the public wel-
fare becomes more pronounced.'
Many feigned advocates of laissez-faire and what is popularly termed
"rugged individualism" feel that their constitutional guarantees have been vio-
lated when they are compelled to divulge information concerning business prac-
tices. Yet it is not to be forgotten that some of these same individuals through
trade agreements, price fixing, inter-locking directorates, and stock manipula-
tion destroy competition, impede commerce, and thereby make such investiga-
tions necessary.
Because of the breadth of the issues involved, this article will deal pri-
marily with federal administrative bodies and federal courts.
At the outset of a discussion of the power of administrative tribunals to
compel testimony, it is desirable to inquire into the power of Congress to com-
pel testimony. If Congress has not such power it cannot vest its agents with
that power. While there are theoretical limitations on the power of Congress
in this respect,2 yet in practice these limitations have proven no handicap to
Congressional investigations and hearings.3
It must also be kept in mind that the federal administrative agencies can-
not be placed in definite categories either as to functions or as to types. This
statement is made because of the tendency of the courts to label a proceeding
"'quasi-judicial"4 when they uphold the power of the agency to compel testimony,5
and "fact finding" or a "fishing expedition" when they deny the agency's pow-
er. A single administrative body may have both judicial and mere fact finding
functions. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Com-
mission serve as good examples of this dual nature of the functions of many ad-
ministrative agencies. The Interstate Commerce Commission, while it is usually
termed a regulatory body performing quasi-judicial functions by the courts,7
1. Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations by, The Federal Trade
Commission (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 708. See introductory note in HENDERSON,
THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssIoN (1924): "The vast changes wrought in the
social and economic aspects of society during the nineteenth century, due to the
introduction of new mechanical forces, the penetrating influence of science, large
scale industry and progressive urbanization have reflected themselves in a
steady extension of legal control of social and economic interest. . . . More
recently, legislative regulation of economic and social interests has resorted to
administrative instruments in the enforcement of legislative policy."
2. Comment (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 234; (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV. 452.
3. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927). While the court indicates
that a "legislative" purpose must be served by such compulsory testimony, yet
it is obviously difficult for a witness to show that no legislative purpose is being
served. See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926)
74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 780, et seq.
4. In re Pacific Ry. Comm., 32 Fed. 241, 247 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1887).
5. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894).
6. Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
7. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894). By
"judicial" functions, as distinguished from "fact finding," is usually meant en-
forcing a law of Congress and deciding upon the rights and obligations of
parties, so as to constitute a case or controversy. See for meaning of "judicial
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1938], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol3/iss4/2
COMMENTS
has often been declared by the court to be performing mere fact finding functions
which were not sufficiently judicial in nature to warrant the exercise of power
to compel testimony.8 The Federal Trade Commission on the other hand, while
it is more generally known for its fact finding and investigatory functions, does
in many instances perform regulatory and what might be termed quasi-judicial
functions. Thus it is preferable to take what might be termed a "functional" ap-
proach to the question of such bodies compelling testimony.
The term "quasi-judicial function" is usually used to denote a proceeding
by a commission in connection with a specific breach of the law or the enforce-
ment of such law. On the other hand a "fact finding" investigation may range
anywhere from an authorization by Congress to investigate the high cost of liv-
ing,9 to an investigation by the commission into combinations of public carriers.' 0
It is not to be questioned that requiring a person to appear and testify or
produce records is depriving him of his liberty and property, yet it is well settled
that if the compulsion is designed to produce testimony before a court, that it
is with due process of law." When the compulsion has the effect of forcing the
person to testify before an administrative tribunal the question of due process
is not nearly so clear.
It is at the outset necessary to recognize that the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court would seem to preclude the possibility of a federal admin-
istrative agency, of its own power, committing for contempt.12 Historically,
however, it is not quite so clear that the power to commit for contempt is ex-
clusively judicial.'3 The power is said to be inherent in American legislatures.'-
The legislative power to commit for contempt has been consistently broadened's
and reached its present status in McGrain v. Daugherty.16 Here the Court,
where no legislation was immediately contemplated, upheld the power of the
function," United States v. Ferreira, 54 U. S. 40 (1851) ; United States v. Todd,
54 U. S. 52 (1851); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
8. Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
9. Federal Trade Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927).
10. Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
11. Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919).
12. The court in Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447,
485, 489 (1894), emphatically states: "Such a body could not, under our system
of government, and consistently with due process of law, be invested with
authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or imprison-
ment. Except in the particular instances enumerated in the Constitution . . .
the power to impose fine or imprisonment in order to compel the performance
of a legal duty imposed by the United States, can only be exerted, under the
law of the land, by a competent judicial tribunal having jurisdiction in the
premises."
prm .es" for, in a judicial sense, there is no such thing as contempt of a
subordinate administrative body."
13. See Fox, HIsToRY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927) 49.
14. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926)
74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 780.
15. Ibid. Compare cases of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880);
In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135
(1927).
16. 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
3
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Senate to punish a recalcitrant witness for refusal to testify and produce books
and records. Apparently the only limit placed upon the power by the decision
was that it serve a "legislative purpose." What constitutes a legislative pur-
pose is obviously a broad question with not too well defined limits. The cases
culminating in the Daugherty case have increasingly recognized the growing need
for complete information upon which to base legislation and the courts have not
been prone to deny to the legislative bodies this power.
While it cannot be said that the position of the Court in the Daugherty case
is in principle contra to that taken in respect to administrative agencies exer-
cising this power, because of differences in the nature of the two bodies, yet
surely the need for accurate and complete information is no greater in one case
than the other.17 The state decisions in some jurisdictions support the power
of certain types of administrative bodies to commit for contempt.18
With what apparently amounts to a denial of power in the federal agencies
to commit for contempt, two other remedies directed at compulsion remain. By
act of Congress it can be made a crime against the United States to refuse to
testify, thus resulting in a criminal prosecution in the federal courts.' 9 This
remedy, while concededly valid, is not sufficiently expeditious. The delay in-
volved in a criminal prosecution seriously impairs the usefulness of this method.
The other remedy is not a new one, 20 but the breadth of its application has not
been fully explored. The method consists briefly of the following: the admin-
istrative tribunal is given power to issue subpoenas for the attendance of wit-
nesses and production of papers; if such subpoena is disregarded, the tribunal is
empowered to invoke the aid of the District Courts of the United States to re-
quire obedience to its demands; finally, the court appealed to is authorized to
order the contumacious witness to comply, and if he fails to do so to punish for
contempt of court.
The constitutional objections to this latter method fall generally into two
categories. First, does a complaint by an administrative tribunal directed to a
court of law, praying for an order to compel obedience to an administrative sub-
poena constitute a "case" or "controversy" to which the judicial power of the
17. See Note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 578, 587, for criticism of denying
administrative bodies power of committing for contempt: "If the function of
the contempt power is to remove impediments to the administration of justice
it is a narrow view which would distinguish between the administrative and
judicial departments."
18. In re Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 Pac. 725 (1929) (legislative committee
held to have power to cite for contempt) ; In re Sanford, 236 Mo. 665, 139 S. W.
376 (1911) (county board of equalization held to have power to cite for contempt);
In re Hayes, 200 N. C. 133, 156 S. E. 791 (1931) (Industrial Compensation Com-
mission held to have power to cite for contempt upon refusal of witness to
testify).
19. For an example of this method, see 27 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U. S. C.
§ 46 (1926) (refusing to testify before the Interstate Commerce Commission
made a crime). See also, Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896).
20. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, § 12, 24 STAT. 379, 49 U. S. C. § 12 (1926) (Act
to Regulate Commerce). This was enacted by the first Congress to consider the
problem of administrative bodies forcing disclosures.
4
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courts of the United States extends? 21 Second, does such compulsory testimony
deprive the witness of due process of law contrary to the Fifth Amendment?
The use of the court process of contempt was early attacked in In re Pacific
Ry. Comm., 22 where Mr. Justice Field speaking for a lower federal court held
such a legislative provision invalid. The basis of the declaration of invalidity
was that such an application to a court of law did not constitute a "case or con-
troversy" within the judicial cognizance.23 Following this set back came the
case of Interstate Commerce Comm., v. Brimson.24 Here in a sharply cut five to
three decision the United States Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress
to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to use court process to com-
pel testimony. The issue again was whether this method of compelling testimony
violated the "separation of powers" doctrine by imposing non-judicial functions
on a court of law. The Interstate Commerce Commission here was perform-
ing a "quasi-judicial" function in that it was acting upon a complaint made to
it concerning an alleged violation of the Commerce Act by certain interstate
carriers. However, the Court made no point of this fact in the decision. Neither
did the Court squarely rule upon whether or not such compulsory testimony be-
fore an administrative tribunal is a violation of due process. Instead both the
majority and the dissenting opinions take issue upon whether such a proceeding
constitutes a "case or controversy" within the judicial cognizance of the courts. 25
The majority states that since Congress has authorized the commission to sum-
mon witnesses and to require the production of books that every citizen owes a
duty to the government to so appear and testify. Whether the commission is
entitled to the evidence it seeks and whether the refusal of the witness to testi-
fy is in violation of his duty as a citizen constitute issues within the judicial
cognizance. The majority expressed a recognition of the need for adequate in-
formation if regulation of interstate commerce was to be successful and thus
justified the "duty" imposed upon the individual. 26 The dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Brewer voices a fear that such a scheme will make the courts "an ad-
junct to the legislative department. '27
21. U. S. CONST. Art. III.
22. 32 Fed. 241 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1887).
23. The court defines a "case or controversy" as follows: "By cases and
controversies are intended the claims of litigants brought before the courts
for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by law or
custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress,
or punishment of wrongs." Id. at 255. See also, Den ex dem. Murray v. Ho-
boken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U. S. 272 (1855); United States v. Ferreira, 54
U. S. 40 (1851); United States v. Todd, 54 U. S. 52 (1851).
24. 154 U. S. 447 (1894).
25. Supra note 23.
26. "An adjudication that Congress could not establish an administrative
body with authority to investigate the subject of interstate commerce and with
power to call witnesses before it, and to require the production of books, docu-
ments, and papers relating to that subject, would go far towards defeating the
object for which the people of the United States placed commerce among the
States under national control." Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154
U. S. 447, 474 (1894).
27. 155 U. S. 3, 4 (1894).
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After the Brimson case the constitutionality of this method of compulsion
seemed firmly established, yet fourteen years later the doctrine of the Brimson
case was considerably modified and limited. In Harriman v. Interstate Com-
merce Comm.,28 the Interstate Commerce Commission, on its own motion, in-
stituted an investigation of consolidations of carriers which it believed tended
to defeat the purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act.29 Witnesses which had
been subpoenaed refused to answer certain questions. The commission proceeded
under Section 12 of the Act and petitioned the circuit court for an order re-
quiring the witnesses to answer the questions. The petition was granted in part
and denied in part. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the petition
was dismissed, the precise holding being that the interstate Commerce Act did
not authorize such investigations unless they concerned "specific breaches" of the
law which the commission was set up to enforce. While this holding is narrow
and on its surface does not hinder the administrative agency greatly, yet the
language of Mr. Justice Holmes is significant. The issue of whether or not
Congress could authorize compulsory testimony before a tribunal engaged in a
purely fact finding function was not passed upon, yet passages like the follow-
ing are not to be overlooked:
"... in other words the power to require testimony is limited, as it
usually is in English-speaking countries at least, to the only cases where
the sacrifice of privacy is necessary-those where the* investigations
concern a specific breach of the law."30
"If we did not think, as we do, that the act clearly showed that the
power to compel the attendance of witnesses was to be exercised only
in connection with the quasi-judicial duties of the commission, we still
should be unable to suppose that such an unprecedented grant was to
be drawn from the counsels of perfection that have been quoted from §§
12 and 21. We could not believe on the strength of other than explicit
and unmistakable words that such autocratic power was given for any
less specific object of inquiry than a breach of existing law, in which,
and in which alone, as we have said, there is any need that personal
matters should be revealed."' '
With these strong statements the majority opinion concedes the power of
administrative tribunals to compel testimony through court process when act-
ing in a "quasi-judicial" capacity, but strongly indicates that even had Congress
expressly authorized the commission to invoke the aid of the courts while pur-
suing a fact finding investigation, that such would have violated due process. Mr.
Justice Day, dissenting, pointed out that the construction placed upon the Act
by the Court contravened one of the intended purposes of the Act, namely to
carry on investigations of a fact finding nature.3 2
The vigorous protest voiced by Mr. Justice Holmes against invasion of
privacy certainly should be weighed against the statement in the Brimson case:
28. 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
29. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 12 (1926).
30. Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407, 419 (1908).
31. Id. at 421.
32. Id. at 423.
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"All must recognize the fact that the full information necessary as a
basis of intelligent legislation by Congress from time to time upon the
subject of interstate commerce cannot be obtained, nor can the rules es-
tablished for the regulation of such commerce be efficiently enforced,
otherwise than through the instrumentality of an administrative body
* . . charged with the duty not only of obtaining the required in-
formation, but of compelling by all lawful methods obedience to such
rules.133
Soon after the decision in the Harriman case Congress amended the Inter-
state Commerce Act34 to authorize investigations by the commission which were
not directed at a specific breach of the law. Subsequent cases have appar-
ently limited the strong language of the Harriman case. In Baltimore and
Ohio R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm.,3 5 the order of the commission, requir-
ing all carriers subject to the act to make monthly reports listing the instances
in which their employees had been permitted to remain on duty for a longer
period than that allowed by the Federal Hours of Service Act was sustained, not-
withstanding that the carriers in effect were being required to file formal ad-
missions of their violations of a federal statute, which imposed heavy penalties.
In Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Goodrich Transit Co.,36 the Court upheld or-
ders prescribing uniform systems of accounts and requiring reports of cor-
porate organization and financial conditions of carriers subject to the act. In
United States v. Louisville and Nashville R. R.,37 it was conceded that the
agents of the commission might inspect and have access to accounts and records
of carriers, yet it was held that they were not authorized by the Act to inspect
general correspondence. In Smith v. Interstate Commerce Comm.,38 proceeding
under a Senate resolution, the commission attempted to ascertain the amounts
which certain carriers had contributed to political campaign funds and lobby-
ing. The witnesses refused to answer questions concerning such contributions
and the Court held that such investigation was proper and that the witnesses
must answer.
It is true that the above decisions modifying the Harriman case doctrine
concern the Interstate Commerce Commission exercising an investigatory fact
finding function and not one of the agencies which is more often looked upon as
a fact finding agency. Nevertheless, they do show that in application the Court
does not go as far in denying power to an administrative agency engaged in a
fact finding function as the Harriman case would indicate.
The Federal Trade Commission has fared less well at the hands of the
courts than has the Interstate Commerce Commission. While the Supreme
33. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 474 (1894).
34. Investigations may now be prosecuted "in any case and as to any
matter or thing concerning which a complaint is authorized to be made .
or concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions of this
Act, or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act." 36
STAT. 551 (1910), 49 U. S. C. § 15 (1926).
35. 221 U. S. 612 (1911).
36. 224 U. S. 194 (1912).
37. 236 U. S. 318 (1915).
38. 245 U. S. 33 (1917).
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Court of the United States has to date never squarely faced the problem of an
administrative fact finding agency using court process to compel testimony, yet
in cases involving the Federal Trade Commission the obstructions placed in the
way of exercising such power have been even greater than in the case of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. A study of the history of legislation cul-
minating in the setting up of the Federal Trade Commission makes it apparent
that the very intention of Congress was to empower the commission to make in-
vestigations of business practices as an aid to regulation through publicity of
facts and sound legislation. 39 Apparently also from the plain language of the
statute Congress intended that the commission should have power to compel tes-
timony when holding fact finding investigations. 40 Nevertheless, the United
States Supreme Court has consistently by statutory construction denied that
Congress intended to authorize the commission to exercise power to proceed a-
gainst contumacious witnesses in the courts of the United States, when the
commission was involved in its investigatory function.41 By this method the
issue of constitutionality has been to date successfully avoided.
The other line of attack upon compulsory testimony and production of evi-
dence by administrative bodies involves charges of unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment and violations of the Fifth Amendment
in respect to self-incrimination. This being too broad a subject to adequately
discuss in this article, it seems preferable to merely state the limitations upon
the power which have been imposed under these Amendments. In the famous
case of Boyd v. United States,42 the Court held that a statute authorizing an
order requiring a defendant to produce an invoice in a quasi-criminal proceeding
was invalid because it compelled the defendant to furnish evidence against him-
self in a quasi-criminal proceeding. The Court found an intimate relation be-
tween the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and concluded that any proceeding in
which a party is compelled to produce testimony privileged under the Fifth
39. See Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal
Trade Commission (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 708, 720.
40. § 10: "That any person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and
testify, or to answer any lawful inquiry, or to produce documentary evidence,
if in his power to do so, in obedience to the subpoena or lawful requirement of
the commission, shall be guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof by a
court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of not less than
$1,000 nor more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year,
or by both such fine and imprisonment." 38 STAT. 723 (1914), 15 U. S. C. 50
(1926). § 9: "Any of the district courts of the United States within thejurisdiction of which such inquiry is carried on may, in case of contumacy or
refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any corporation or other person, issue
an order requiring such corporation or other persons to appear before the com-
mission, or to produce documentary evidence if so ordered, or to give evidence
touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court
may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof." 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15
U. S. C. § 49 (1926).
41. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924);
Federal Trade Comm. v. Baltimore Grain Co., 267 U. S. 586 (1925); Federal
Trade Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927).
42. 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
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Amendment, violates not only the Fifth Amendment but amounts to an unrea-
sonable search and seizure. Whether or not this was a warranted extension of
the search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment has been a subject of
much controversy.43 With the case of Hale v. Henkel,44 a new qualification was
added to orders requiring the production of evidence. The case held that a
subpoena issued by a grand jury investigating charges of violation of anti-trust
laws was invalid as violating the Fourth Amendment when it made a blanket
demand for all papers, letters, and documents relating to the relations of six
companies. The ground of objection to the subpoena was that it was so indef-
inite and all inclusive as to amount to an unreasonable search for evidence.
Assuming the soundness of the doctrine of the above two cases, it would
seem that little opportunity is afforded under the Federal Trade Commission
Act for the application of the doctrine of the Boyd case because of the immunity
provisions of the act.45 The provision which is typical of such acts affords nat-
ural persons immunity from prosecution for offenses revealed by compulsory tes-
timony. As to corporations it is well settled that they are not privileged against
self-incriminating evidence. 46 Thus it would seem that there is little ground for
objection on this score to compulsory testimony.
The most recent -expression of the United States Supreme Court on the
subject of administrative bodies utilizing court process to compel testimony is
found in Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm. 47 Here, as in prior cases
discussed, the Court avoids a square holding upon the issue but the sharp clash
between the majority and the minority opinions indicates the vital nature of
the issues involved. In this case the Securities and Exchange Commission chal-
lenged the truth of a registration statement and notified the registrant to appear
at a hearing some weeks later and show cause why a stop order should not issue
suspending its effectiveness. Thereafter the commission's subpoena was served
on the registrant commanding him to appear and testify and bring books and
papers pertaining to the filed statement. The registrant then gave formal notice
that his statement was withdrawn and submitted motions to quash the subpoena,
which he declined to obey, and to dismiss the proceeding. The commission, how-
ever, persisted in the investigation and obtained from the district court an order
requiring the registrant to appear and answer questions. A regulation of the
commission provided that no statements filed could be withdrawn without consent
of the commission once they were submitted. By declaring the commission's
proceeding analogous to an equity proceeding for an injunction, the majority
concludes that the registrant could withdraw his statement thus terminating the
43. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 11; Comment (1927) 36 YALE
L. J. 536.
44. 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
45. 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 49 (1926).
46. Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923).
47. 298 U. S. 1 (1936).
9
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proceeding. After hurdling this point the Court easily insists that no basis re-
mains after withdrawal for the commission continuing its investigation and
thus the subpoena could not be enforced under the commissions alleged general
powers of investigation. The majority cites with approval the cases of Harri-
man v. Interstate Commerce Comm.,48 In re Pacific Ry. Comm.,49 Federal Trade
Comm. v. American Tobacco Co.,50 and Boyd v. United States,51 and indicated
that an investigation by the commission after withdrawal of the statement would
amount to no more than a "fishing expedition." The majority seems much im-
pressed with the danger of infringement upon constitutional rights involved in
allowing such investigations but apparently takes little notice of the fact that
protection of the investing public was the end in view.
Mr. Justice Cardozo speaking for the minority refuses to admit that the
registrant can withdraw and thus avoid an investigation concerning a statement
which he filed. Allowing such withdrawal would defeat the very purpose of the
act and allow wrongdoers to excuse their own deceit, according to the minority
composed of Justices Cardozo, Brandeis and Stone. Mr. Justice Cardozo in
answering the dire warnings of the majority in regard to allowing the commission
to carry on the investigation after the attempted withdrawal said,
"The opinion of the court reminds us of the dangers that wait upon
the abuse of power by officialdom unchained. The warning is so fraught
with truth that it can never be untimely. But timely too is the re-
minder, as a host of impoverished investors will be ready to attest, that
there are dangers in untruths and half truths when certificates mas-
querading as securities pass current in the market. There are dangers
in spreading a belief that untruths and half truths, designed to be passed
on for the guidance of confiding buyers, are to be ranked as peceadillos,
or even perhaps as part of the amenities of business. When wrongs
such as these have been committed or attempted, they must be dragged
to light and pilloried. To permit an offending registrant to stifle an
inquiry by precipitate retreat on the eve of his exposure is to give im-
munity to guilt; to encourage falsehood and evasion; to invite the
cunning and unscrupulous to gamble with detection. If withdrawal with-
out leave may check investigation before securities have been issued, it
may do as much thereafter, unless indeed consistency be thrown to the
winds, for by teaching of the decision withdrawal without leave is
equivalent to a stop order, with the result that forthwith there is nothing
to investigate. The statute and its sanctions become the sport of clever
knaves.
"Appeal is vaguely made to some constitutional immunity, whether
express or implied is not stated with distinctness. It cannot be an im.
munity from the unreasonable search or seizure of papers or effects:
the books and documents of the witness are unaffected by the challenged
order. It cannot be an immunity from impertinent intrusion into matters
of strictly personal concern: the intimacies of private business lose
their self-regarding quality after they have been spread upon official
records to induce official action. . . . If the immunity rests upon
some express provision of the Constitution, the opinion of the court does
not point us to the article or section. If its source is to be found in some
impalpable essence, the spirit of the Constitution or the philosophy of
government favored by the Fathers, one may take leave to deny that
48. 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
49. 32 Fed. 241 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1887).
50. 264 U. S. 298 (1924).
51. 116 U. S. 616 (1885).
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there is anything in that philosophy or spirit whereby the signer of a
statement filed with a regulatory body to induce official action is pro-
tected against inquiry into his own purpose to deceive. The argument
for immunity lays hold of strange analogies. A Commission which is
without coercive powers, which cannot arrest or amerce or imprison
though a crime has been uncovered, or even punish for contempt, but can
only inquire and report, the propriety of every question in the course
of the inquiry being subject to the supervision of the ordinary courts of
justice, is likened with denunciatory fervor to the Star Chamber of the
Stuarts. Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile.
"The Rule now assailed was wisely conceived and lawfully adopted
to foil the plans of knaves intent upon obscuring or suppressing the
knowledge of their knavery."
5 2
The above quotation clearly sets forth the two elements involved in this
problem, namely, the need for information upon which to base sound administra-
tion of laws and enactment of legislation, weighed against the fear of invasion
of constitutional rights. It is also notable to observe that Mr. Justice Cardozo
has difficulty in seeing exactly what constitutional right the majority thinks
would be invaded by such an investigation. This tendency is found in all cases
on this subject, in that while most writers have assumed that from the indica-
tions of the court a "fishing expedition "infringes upon the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment, yet the court has never squarely so held.
As to what the future trend will be in this field on the basis of cases like
Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm., it is difficult to predict, but if govern-
ment is to continue its present trend in regulation of business it is inconceivable
that agencies can effectively function if they are to be dealt with in such an
unsympathetic fashion by the courts.
H. L. LISLE, L.B. '38.
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS IN SEVERAL JURISDICTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE WILL
Most courts hold as a matter of conflict of laws that the laws of the de-
ceased's last domicile govern the descent of his personalty under a testamentary
disposition.1 As to realty, it is well settled that the law of the jurisdiction in
which it is situated governs. 2 But the question still remains as to how this
law is applied.
52. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 298 U. S. 1, 32, 33 (1935).
1. ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) § 177; Willett's Appeal, 50 Conn. 330 (1882);
In re Barney's Will, 94 N. J. Eq. 392, 120 Atl. 513 (1923); Kirkland v. Cal-
houn, 147 Tenn. 388, 248 S. W. 302 (1922); Jacobs v. Willis' Heirs, 147 Tenn.
539, 249 S. W. 815 (1922).
2. Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 498, 502; Carey, A Suggested Fundamental
Basis of Jurisdiction With Special Emphasis on Judicial Proceedings Affecting
Decedents' Estates (1929) 24 ILL. L. REV. 41; Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442,
81 So. 127 (1919); In re Brandow's Estate, 59 S. D. 364, 240 N. W. 323 (1932);
Kirkland v. Calhoun, 147 Tenn. 388, 248 S. W. 302 (1922).
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It is generally recognized that persons parties to prior adjudications in
foreign jurisdictions are bound by them as a matter of res adjudicata.3 In the
case of In re Barney,4 the court went so far as to hold the beneficiaries under a
will in such privity with the executor that they were bound by prior foreign
proceedings to which the executor was a party. This decision has been criticized
and it has been pointed out that such a principle would require the legatees to
prevent the will from being rejected in any state where the testator owned prop-
erty.5
The federal courts do not interpret the full faith and credit clause of the
Federal Constitution 6 as requiring the courts of one state to give conclusive ef-
fect to the prior decree of probate in another jurisdiction.7 This is especially
true where jurisdictional matters as the decision of domicile of the testator are
involved.8 It is interesting to notice that the Illinois Supreme Court has held
that legislation such as the Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Probated,' 0 requiring
recognition of foreign proceedings does not deprive any citizen of any right,
privilege, or property without due process of law or abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of various states.
Conflict often occurs between decisions of the courts of several states where
two or more have admitted the will to domiciliary probate. There are three
views as to the effect of a prior foreign decision of the testator's domicile upon
probate in another state. The majority view is that a foreign decision of domi-
cile does not preclude or affect the local court's decision as to property within
the latter's jurisdiction." The case of Loewenthal v. Mande l12 illustrates this
view. There the decedent lived in New York first, moving to Florida a number
of years before his death. He possessed personal property in both states. His
will was admitted to domiciliary probate in New York and then to ancillary
probate in Florida. Then a contestant, who had appeared and consented to
both previous proceedings, filed a petition in Florida, to set aside the ancillary
probate there because the testator was a resident of Florida. It was held that
the contestant was barred from protest because he was personally bound by pre-
vious proceedings. However, the court announced that other interested parties
3. Willett's Appeal, 50 Conn. 330 (1882); Loewenthal v. Mandell, 125
Fla. 685, 170 So. 169 (1936); In re Crane's Estate, 205 Mich. 673, 172 N. W.
584 (1919) ; In re Fischer's Estate, 118 N. J. Eq. 599, 180 Atl. 633 (1935).
4. 94 N. J. Eq. 392, 120 AtI. 513 (1923).
5. Note (1923) 33 YAm L. J. 103.
6. U. S. CONST. Art. 4, § 1.
7. Blount v. Walker, 134 U. S. 607 (1890); Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S.
350 (1900).
8. Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43 (1907); Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162
(1914); Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917).
9. Pratt v. Hawley, 297 Ill. 244, 130 N. E. 793 (1921).
10. 9 U. L. A. 423.
11. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917); Willett's Appeal,
50 Conn. 330 (1882); Colvin v. Jones, 194 Mich. 670, 161 N. W. 847 (1917);
Richards v. Huff, 146 Okla. 108, 293 Pac. 1028 (1930); Holland v. Jackson,
121 Tex. 1, 37 S. W. (2d) 726 (1931).
12. 125 Fla. 685, 170 So. 169 (1936).
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not bound by prior proceedings could have the ancillary probate set aside because
domiciliary proceedings must be had within the state if the testator was domiciled
there. The court stated that the fact that it was decided in New York that the
testator was domiciled there does not bar the Florida court from deciding he
was domiciled within its jurisdiction.
The second view is found in a long line of Maryland decisions.13 This state
will recognize a foreign adjudication regarding the matter of domicile as bind-
ing and final. For example, in Kurtz v. Kurtz' Estate,14 a Pennsylvania court
admitted the testator's will to probate deciding he was domiciled within that
state. A certified copy of the Pennsylvania proceedings was filed in Maryland
as provided for by the Maryland statute15 for filing foreign court proceedings.
Upon this certified copy, ancillary probate was allowed. Then the testator's son
petitioned to contest the will, alleging that the testator's residence was in Mary-
land and that therefore the former proceedings were void. The Maryland Court
of Appeals held that it was without jurisdiction to determine domicile when
the question had been decided by another state. The court based its decision
on the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.
North Dakota adopts a position somewhat between the majority view and the
Maryland view. In this state, a foreign court's decision that a testator was
domiciled in its jurisdiction creates a rebuttable presumption that this is true.
If the fact of domicile as decided by the foreign court is not questioned, its deci-
sion prevails. A leading case is McEwen v. McEwen,'8 wherein it was stated
that although the place where the testator was domiciled at the time of death
has exclusive original jurisdiction over the testator's will, yet, if the question
of domicile is raised the foreign court's decision will only create a presumption
which may be rebutted.
The effect of decisions in foreign states as to the validity of wills in rela-
tion to form and mode of execution, fraud, undue influence, testamentary char-
acter, and mental competency of the testator varies in different jurisdictions.
Shimshak -v. Cox17 distinguishes between the effect of foreign probate on the
validity of the will as to undue influence, fraud, testamentary character, and
mental competency on the one hand and the validity of form and mode of execu-
tion on the other. In that case the testator died in Arkansas possessing realty
in Louisiana. The will, which was made in Arkansas, was probated there. Then
it was admitted to ancillary probate in Louisiana over the objections of heirs
there although it was not executed in the form required by the Louisiana code.
13. Stanley v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 87 Md. 450, 451, 40 Atl. 53
(1898); Harding v. Schapiro, 120 Md. 541, 87 At. 951 (1913); Whiting v.
Shipley, 127 Md. 113, 118, 96 AtI. 285 (1915); Johns Hopkins University v.
Uhrig, 145 Md. 114, 125 Atl. 606 (1924); Pattison v. Firor, 146 Md. 243,
126 Ati. 109 (1924).
14. 182 Atl. 456 (Md. 1936).
15. MARYLAND CoDE (1924) art. 93, § 364.
16. 50 N. D. 662, 197 N. W. 862 (1924).
17. 166 La. 102, 116 So. 714 (1928).
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The court held that a prior foreign probate was conclusive as to the validity of
the form and mode of execution, but that it was not binding as concerns things
other than execution unless the persons parties to the Louisiana proceedings
were parties to the prior foreign suit. Thus third persons could show lack of
testamentary character, mental capacity, fraud and undue influence. This dis-
tinction merely serves to complicate the problem. If the foreign proceeding de-
serves recognition as to validity of form and manner of execution, it should
also be followed as to decisions on testamentary character and mental competency.
The majority of courts in discussing the effect of foreign proceedings on the
validity of the will do not make the distinction drawn by the Louisiana court. 18
However, the Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, 19 provides that a will exe-
cuted in the mode prescribed by laws either of the place where made or of the
testator's domicile shall be deemed to be duly executed. This act does not pro-
vide specifically that the laws of the domicile or the place where made should
govern as to testamentary character and mental competency or fraud and un-
due influence. It only states that those laws shall govern as to the mode of exe-
cution. The act was in force and involved in the Shimshak case and the court
seemed to give weight to the act as one basis for drawing their distinction. But
cases in other jurisdictions in which the act is in force do not follow this view.20
The Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Probated,2 ' provides that a will duly allowed
and admitted to probate outside of a state shall be allowed if upon a hearing by
the proper court it appears that the will has been duly proved, allowed and ad-
mitted outside of the state. The effect of this is to let the foreign probate pro-
ceedings govern. The provision for a hearing by a local court to determine
whether the will was duly admitted to probate under the laws of the foreign state
gives the local court the only check upon the decisions of the foreign tribunals.
This restraint has only been exercised to determine whether the will was duly
admitted under the law of the foreign state and not to determine whether the
law was such that a will probated under it should not be duly admitted. 22
Where two states grant domiciliary probate, obviously the courts of one
will not be bound by its sister state's decision as to the property within the
court's own jurisdiction. Thus the second court may, as to property within its
jurisdiction, differ from the first court's determination on the issues of execu-
18. Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608 (1883); Morrison v. Hass, 229
Mass. 514, 118 N. E. 893 (1918); Garvey v. United States Fidelity and G. Co.,
77 App. Div. 391, 79 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1st Dep't. 1902).
19. 9 U. L. A. 419. This act had been adopted by the following states
at the end of 1929: Alaska, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nevada, New York, Wisconsin, and the territory of Hawaii.
20. Drohan v. Avellar, 276 Mass. 441, 177 N. E. 583 (1931) ; In re
Marsland's Estate, 142 Misc. 230, 254 N. Y. Supp. 293 (Surr. Ct. 1931); In re
Logasa's Estate, 161 Misc. 774, 293 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
21. 9 U. L. A. 423. This act at the end of 1927 was adopted by Illinois,
Louisiana, Nevada, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
22. Sanders v. New Staunton Coal Co., 213 Ill. App. 493 (1919); Terry
v. Webb, 159 Tenn. 642, 21 S. W. (2d) 622 (1929); In re De Franceschi's
Estate, 17 Tenn. App. 673, 70 S. W. (2d) 513 (1933).
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tion of the will, capacity of the testator, undue influence, and fraud.23 As we
have seen above, the situation where there are two domiciliary probates would
be an impossibility in some jurisdictions because they would hold themselves
bound by the earlier decision of the other state that the testator was domiciled
therein.
A will may be admitted to ancillary probate in most jurisdictions even though
it has not been probated at the domicile.24 A minority have stated that they will
not allow original probate unless the testator was domiciled within their juris-
diction.25 New Jersey once took this position,26 but by statute now allows ancil-
lary probate even though there has been no domiciliary adjudication.2 7 Some
courts adopt the view that although ancillary proceedings can occur before dom-
iciliary, they will await the establishment of the will in the testator's domicile
unless a good reason for doing otherwise appears.28 An example of the latter
view is the case of Payne v. Payne.29 There the court said that the general rule
to be followed is that the validity of wills and the right of succession generally
are to be determined by the courts of the state where the deceased had his last
domicile, unless circumstances demand a different course of action to avoid
loss, prevent justice, or subserve some substantial good. Just when circum-
stances are such as to require allowance of ancillary probate before domiciliary
is apparently within the discretion of the court and the standard set is very in-
definite. It is recognized by all courts whether they allow ancillary proceedings
before domiciliary or not, that the primary place for probate of wills is at the
domicile and that the normal order is domiciliary before ancillary.30
Where a testamentary document has been admitted to probate in one state
before a decision as to its validity has been reached at the domicile, the ancillary
proceeding as a general rule does not affect the decision as to the will's validity
when it is presented for probate at the domicile.31 However, there is a small
23. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917); Loewenthal v.
Mandell, 125 Fla. 685, 170 So. 169 (1936); Holland v. Jackson, 121 Tex. 1,
37 S. W. (2d) 726 (1931).
24. Higgins v. Eaton, 202 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 2d 1913); State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Wright, 109 S. W. (2d) 123 (Ark. 1937); Parnell v.
Thompson, 81 Kan. 119, 105 Pic. 502 (1909), 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 658 (1911);
Knight v. Hollings, 73 N. H. 495, 63 Atl. 38 (1906); In re Clayson's Estate,
26 Wash. 253, 66 Pac. 410 (1901).
25. Davis v. Upson, 230 Ill. 327, 82 N. E. 824 (1907), criticized in (1908)
2 ILL. L. REv. 605; In re Corning's Estate, 159 Mich. 474, 124 N. W. 514 (1910);
Read v. Baker, 195 Wis. 128, 217 N. W. 709 (1928).
26. In re Dodge's Will, 104 Atl. 646 (N. J. 1918).
27. New Jersey Public Laws (1921) 831.
28. In re Orrantia's Estate, 36 Ariz. 311, 285 Pac. 266 (1930); Davis
v. Upson, 230 Ill. 327, 82 N. E. 824 (1907); Rackemann v. Taylor, 204 Mass.
394, 90 N. E. 552 (1910).
29. 239 Ky. 99, 39 S. W. (2d) 205 (1931).
30. Godwin v. Godwin, 129 Ga. 67, 58 S. E. 652 (1907); Shimshak v. Cox,
166 La. 102, 116 So. 714 (1928); Renwick v. Macomber, 233 Mass. 530, 124
N. E. 670 (1919); McEwen v. McEwen, 50 N. D. 662, 197 N. W. 862 (1924);
Youngblood v. Rector, 126 Okla. 210, 259 Pac. 579 (1927).
31. Kerr v. Moon, 22 U. S. 565 (1824); In re Clark's Estate, 148 Cal.
108, 82 Pac. 760 (1905); Ives v. Salisbw~y's Heirs, 56 Vt. 565 (1883);
Thrasher v. Ballard, 33 W. Va. 285, 10 S. E. 411 (1889).
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minority taking the opposite viewpoint. In the recent case of State ex rel. At-
torney-General v. Wright,3 2 prior ancillary probate in Texas was allowed to
govern over domiciliary probate in Arkansas as to the validity which disposed
of personalty of the will as to the question of fraud. This was put upon the
basis of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. In this
case, the state of Arkansas which claimed the decedent's property through es-
cheat was not a party to the prior proceedings and thus not personally bound
by them. The fact that Arkansas had a statute3 3 similar to that of Texas 34
providing for probate of a non-resident's will may have influenced the decision
since this would make it appear that the policies of the two states in this re-
spect were not antagonistic. Massachusetts has held a prior adjudication ad-
mitting a will to probate binding upon Massachusetts courts even though Massa-
chusetts is the state of domicile.3 5 Where a will is admitted to probate before
there is a decision in the testator's domicile as to the will's validity, a subsequent
refusal of probate at the domicile will not affect the ancillary proceeding.3 6
Where probate at the testator's domicile occurs first, most courts distinguish
between the effect of the proceeding on the validity of the will as far as person-
alty is concerned and the effect on realty s7 In so far as realty is involved, pro-
bate at the testator's domicile is not conclusive as to the validity of the will in
other states.38 This is based upon the theory that each state has as an incident
to its common right of sovereignty the control over the land within its borders.
As to personalty, most cases hold that the domiciliary decision is binding upon
the subject of the validity of the will.3 9 Although there are cases holding to the
contrary they are in a distinct minority.40
Missouri courts hold that the law of the jurisdiction where realty is situated
32. 109 S. W. (2d) 123 (Ark. 1937).
33. CRAWFORD AND MOSES DIG. OF ARE. STAT. (1921) § 10511.
34. VERNON'S TEX. STAT. 1936, art. 3293, § 2.
35. Morrison v. Hass, 118 N. E. 893 (Mass. 1918).
36. Higgins v. Eaton, 202 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 2d 1913); Milner v. Hoag,
182 App. Div. 524, 169 N. Y. Supp. 755 (2d Dep't 1918); Acklin v. Paschal,
48 Tex. 147 (1877).
37. Kirkland v. Calhoun, 147 Tenn. 388, 248 S. W. 302 (1922); Thrasher
v. Ballard, 33 W. Va. 285, 10 S. E. 411 (1889); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Walsh,
87 Wis. 67, 57 N. W. 969 (1894).
38. Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 502; Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608
(1883); Dickey v. Vann, 81 Ala. 425, 8 So. 195 (1886); Lynch v. Miller, 54
Iowa 516, 6 N. W. 740 (1880); Shimshak v. Cox, 166 La. 102, 116 So. 714
(1928); Carpenter v. Bell, 96 Tenn. 294, 34 S. W. 209 (1896); Kirkland v.
Calhoun, 147 Tenn. 388, 248 S. W. 302 (1922).
39. Evansville Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E.
592 (1897); In. re Coppock's Estate, 72 Mont. 431, 234 Pac. 258 (1925);
Garvey v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 77 App. Div. 391, 79 N. Y. Supp.
337 (1st Dep't 1902); Martin v. Stovall, 103 Tenn. 1, 52 S. W. 296 (1899);
Kirkland v. Calhoun, 147 Tenn. 388, 248 S. W. 302 (1922); Ives v. Salisbury's
Heirs, 56 Vt. 565 (1883); Thrasher v. Ballard, 33 W. Va. 285, 10 S. E.
411 (1889).
40. Jones v. Jones, 107 Ill. App. 464 (1903); Ewing v. Sneed, 5 J. J.
Marsh. 459 (Ky. 1831); Crusoe v. Butler, 36 Miss. 150 (1858); Smith v.
Neilson, 13 Lea 461 (Tenn. 1884).
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governs the disposition of land by will. 41 Where personalty is involved, the law
of the domicile is applied.42 However, the probate of a will in a foreign state
will not be held binding on Missouri courts as an adjudication of the validity of
the will in so far as realty is involved on the basis that foreign courts do not have
jurisdiction over land in Missouri. 4s This has been held not to contravene the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution."4
HARRY P. THOMSON, JR.
41. Applegate v. Smith, 31 Mo. 166 (1860); Hines v. Hines, 243 Mo.
480, 147 S. W. 774 (1912); Fenderson v. Mo. Tie & Timber Co., 104 Mo. App.
290, 78 S. W. 819 (1904).
42. White v. Greenway, 303 Mo. 691, 263 S. W. 104 (1924).
43. Keith v. Johnson, 97 Mo. 223, 10 S. W. 597 (1888); Emmons v.
Gordon, 140 Mo. 490, 41 S. W. 998 (1897); Fenderson v. Missouri Tie and
Timber Co., 104 Mo. App. 290, 78 S. W. 819 (1904).
44. Hines v. Hines, 243 Mo. 480, 147 S. W. 774 (1912).
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